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Abstract— Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. In particular, a single perturbation known
as the universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) can foil most
classification tasks conducted by DNNs. Thus, different methods
for generating UAPs are required to fully evaluate the vulnera-
bility of DNNs. A realistic evaluation would be with cases that
consider targeted attacks; wherein the generated UAP causes
DNN to classify an input into a specific class. However, the
development of UAPs for targeted attacks has largely fallen
behind that of UAPs for non-targeted attacks. Therefore, we
propose a simple iterative method to generate UAPs for targeted
attacks. Our method combines the simple iterative method
for generating non-targeted UAPs and the fast gradient sign
method for generating a targeted adversarial perturbation for
an input. We applied the proposed method to state-of-the-art
DNN models for image classification and proved the existence
of almost imperceptible UAPs for targeted attacks; further, we
demonstrated that such UAPs are easily generatable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely used for image
classification, a task in which an input image is assigned a
class from a fixed set of classes. For example, DNN-based
image classification has applications in medical science (e.g.,
medical image-based diagnosis [1]) and self-driving technol-
ogy (e.g., detecting and classifying traffic signs [2]).
However, DNNs are known to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples [3], which are input images that cause misclassi-
fications by DNNs and are generally generated by adding
specific, imperceptible perturbations to original input images
that have been correctly classified using DNNs. Interestingly,
a single perturbation that can induce DNN failure in most
image classification tasks is also generatable as a univer-
sal adversarial perturbation (UAP) [4]. The vulnerability
in DNNs to adversarial attacks (UAPs, in particular) is a
security concern for practical applications of DNNs [5].
Thus, the development of methods for generating UAPs is
required to evaluate the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial
attacks.
A simple iterative method [4] for generating UAPs has
been proposed; however, it is limited to non-targeted attacks
that cause misclassification (i.e., a task failure resulting in
an input image being assigned an incorrect class). More
realistic cases need to consider targeted attacks, wherein
generating a UAP would cause the DNN to classify an input
image into a specific class (e.g., into the “diseased” class
in medical diagnosis). A method for generating UAPs for
targeted attacks based on a generative network model has
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been proposed [6]; however, it requires high computational
costs. The targeted adversarial patch approach for targeted
universal adversarial attacks [7] has been proposed; however,
such adversarial patches are perceptible.
Thus, herein, we propose a simple iterative method to
generate almost imperceptible UAPs for targeted attacks.
II. TARGETED UNIVERSAL ADVERSARIAL
PERTURBATIONS
Our algorithm (Algorithm 1) for generating UAPs for
targeted attacks is an extension of the simple iterative al-
gorithm for generating UAPs for non-targeted attacks [4].
Similar to the non-targeted UAP algorithm, our algorithm
considers a classifier C(x) that returns the class or label
(with the highest confidence score) for an input image x. The
algorithm starts with ρ = 0 (no perturbation) and iteratively
updates the UAP ρ under the constraint that the Lp norm of
the perturbation is equal to or less than a small value ξ (i.e.,
‖ρ‖p ≤ ξ) by additively obtaining an adversarial perturbation
for an input image x, which is randomly selected from
an input image set X without replacement. These iterative
updates continue up till the termination conditions have
been satisfied. Unlike the non-targeted UAP algorithm, our
algorithm uses the fast gradient sign method for targeted
attacks (tFGSM) to generate targeted UAPs, whereas the
non-targeted UAP algorithm uses a method (e.g., DeepFool
[8]) that generates a non-targeted adversarial example for an
input image.
Algorithm 1 Computation of a targeted UAP
Input: Set X of input images, target class y, classifier C(·),
cap ξ on Lp norm of the perturbation, norm type p (1,
2, or ∞), maximum number imax of iterations.
Output: Targeted UAP vector ρ.
1: ρ← 0, rst ← 0, i← 0
2: while rst < 1 and i < imax do
3: for x ∈X in random order do
4: if C(x+ ρ) 6= y then
5: xadv ← x+ ρ+ ψ(x+ ρ, y)
6: if C(xadv) = y then
7: ρ← project(xadv − x, p, ξ)
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: rst ← |X|−1
∑
x∈X I (C(x+ ρ) = y)
12: i← i+ 1
13: end while
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tFGSM generates a targeted adversarial perturbation
ψ(x, y) that causes an image x to be classified into the
target class y using the gradient ∇xL(x, y) of the loss
function with respect to pixels [3,9]. For the L∞ norm, the
perturbation is calculated as
ψ(x, y) = − · sign (∇xL(x, y)) , (1)
where  (> 0) the attack strength. For the L1 and L2 norms,
the perturbation is obtained as
ψ(x, y) = − ∇xL(x, y)‖∇xL(x, y)‖p . (2)
The adversarial example xadv is obtained as follows:
xadv = x+ ψ(x, y). (3)
At each iteration step, our algorithm computes a targeted
adversarial perturbation ψ(x+ρ, y), if the perturbated image
x+ρ is not classified into the target class y (i.e., C(x+ρ) 6=
y); however, the non-targeted UAP algorithm obtains a non-
targeted adversarial perturbation that satisfies C(x + ρ) 6=
C(x) if C(x+ ρ) = C(x). After generating the adversarial
example at this step (i.e., xadv ← x + ρ + ψ(x + ρ, y)),
the perturbation ρ is updated if xadv is classified into the
target class y (i.e., C(xadv) = y), whereas the non-targeted
UAP algorithm updates the perturbation ρ if C(x + ρ) 6=
C(x). Note that tFGSM does not ensure that adversarial
examples are classified into a target class. When updating ρ,
a projection function project(x, p, ξ) is used to satisfy the
constraint that ‖ρ‖p ≤ ξ (i.e., ρ← project(xadv − x, p, ξ).
This projection is defined as follows:
project(x, p, ξ) = argmin
x′
‖x−x′‖2 s.t. ‖x′‖p ≤ ξ (4)
This update procedure terminates when the targeted at-
tack success rate rts for input images (i.e., the pro-
portion of input images classified into the target class;
|X|−1∑x∈X I (C(x+ ρ) = y) equals 100% (i.e., all input
images are classified into the target class due to the UAP ρ)
or the number of iterations reaches to the maximum imax.
A pseudo code of our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Our algorithm was implemented using Keras
(version 2.2.4; keras.io) and Adversarial Robustness
360 Toolbox [9] (version 1.0; github.com/IBM/
adversarial-robustness-toolbox). The source
code of our proposed method for generating targeted UPAs
is available from our GitHub repository: github.com/
hkthirano/targeted_UAP_CIFAR10.
III. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Deep neural network models and image datasets
To evaluate targeted UAPs, we used 2 DNN models that
were trained to classify the CIFAR-10 image dataset (www.
cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html). The CIFAR-
10 dataset includes 60,000 RGB color images with size of
32×32 pixels classified into 10 classes: airplane, automobile,
bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck. 60,000
images are available in each class. The dataset comprises
50,000 training images (5,000 images per class) and 10,000
test images (1,000 images per class). In particular, we
used the VGG-20 and ResNet-20 models for the CIFAR-
10 dataset obtained from a GitHub repository (github.
com/GuanqiaoDing/CNN-CIFAR10); their test accura-
cies were 91.1% and 91.3%, respectively.
Moreover, we also considered three DNN models trained
to classify the ImageNet image dataset (www.image-net.
org). The ImageNet dataset comprises RGB color images
with size of 224 × 224 pixels classified into 1,000 classes.
In particular, we used the VGG-16, VGG-19, and ResNet-
50 models for ImageNet dataset available in Keras (version
2.2.4; keras.io), and their test accuracies were 71.6%,
71.5%, and 74.6%, respectively.
B. Generating targeted adversarial perturbations and eval-
uating their performance
Targeted UAPs were generated using an input image set
obtained from the datasets. The parameters p was set to 2. We
generated targeted UAPs with various norms by adjusting the
parameters  and ξ. The magnitude of a UAP was measured
using a normalized L2 norm of the perturbation; in particular,
we used the ratio ζ of the L2 norm of the UAP to the average
L2 norm of an image in a dataset. The average L2 norms
of an image were 7,381 and 50,135 in the CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet datasets, respectively.
For comparing the performance of targeted UAPs gener-
ated by our method with random controls, we also generated
random vectors (random UAPs) sampled uniformly from the
sphere of a given radius [4].
The performance of UAPs was evaluated using the targeted
attack success rate rts. In particular, we considered the
success rates rts for input images. In addition to this, we
also computed the success rates rts for test images to exper-
imentally evaluate the performance of UAPs for unknown
images. A test image set was obtained from the dataset and
was not overlapped with the input image set.
C. Case of CIFAR-10 models
For the CIFAR-10 models, we used 10,000 input images
to generate the targeted UAPs. The input image set was
obtained by randomly selecting 1,000 images per class from
the training images of the CIFAR-10 dataset. All 10,000 test
images of the dataset were used as test images for evaluating
the UAP performance. We considered the targeted attack to
each class. The parameters  and imax were set to 0.006 and
10, respectively.
For the targeted attacks to each class, the targeted attack
success rates rts for both the input image set and the
UAP test image set, rapidly increased with perturbation rate,
despite a low ζ (2–6%). In particular, the success rates were
> 80% for ζ = 5% (Fig. 1). The targeted UAPs with ζ = 5%
were almost imperceptible (Fig. 2). Moreover, the UAPs
seem to represent object shapes of each target class. The
target attack success rates reached to ∼ 100% for ζ > 10%.
The success rates of the targeted UAPs were significantly
higher than those of random UAPs. These tendencies were
observed both in the VGG-20 model and in the ResNet-20
model.
Fig. 1. Line plot of target attack success rate rts versus perturbation
rate for targeted attacks to each class of the CIFAR-10 dataset. Legend
label indicates DNN model and image set used for computing rts. For
example, “VGG-20 input” indicates rts of targeted UAPs against the
VGG-20 model computed using the input image set. Additional argument
“(random)” indicates that random UAPs were used instead of targeted UAPs.
D. Case of ImageNet models
For the ImageNet models, we used the validation dataset
used in the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge 2012 (ILSVRC2012; www.image-net.org/
challenges/LSVRC/2012/) to generate the targeted
UAPs. The dataset comprises 50,000 images (50 images per
class). We used 40,000 images as input images. The input
image set was obtained by randomly selecting 40 images
per class. The rest (10,000 images; 10 images per class) was
used as test images for evaluating UAPs. The parameters 
and imax were set to 0.5 and 5, respectively.
In this study, we considered targeted attacks to three
classes (golf ball, broccoli, and stone wall) that were ran-
domly selected from 1,000 classes in a previous study [5]
because of page limitation.
We generated targeted UAPs with ζ = 6% (ξ = 3, 000)
and ζ = 8% (ξ = 4, 000). The target attack success rates
Fig. 2. Targeted UAPs (top panel) with ζ = 5% against the VGG-20
model for the CIFAR-10 dataset and their adversarial attacks to an original
(i.e., non-perturbated) image (left panel) randomly selected from the images
that, without perturbation, correctly classified into each source class and,
with the perturbations, correctly classified into the target classes: airplane
(0), automobile (1), bird (2), cat (3), deer (4), dog (5), frog (6), horse (7),
ship (8), and truck (9). Note that the UAPs are emphatically displayed for
clarity; in particular, each UAP was scaled with the maximum of 1 and the
minimum of 0.
rts were between ~30% and ~75% and between ~60% and
~90% when ζ = 6% and ζ = 8%, respectively (Table 1). The
success rates of the targeted UAPs were significantly higher
than those of random UAPs, which were less than 1% in all
cases.
Table 1. Targeted attack success rates rts of targeted UAPs against the
DNN models for each target class. rts for input images and test images
were shown.
Target class Model ζ = 6% ζ = 8%input test input test
Golf ball
VGG-16 58.0% 57.6% 81.6% 80.6%
VGG-19 55.3% 55.2% 81.3% 80.1%
ResNet-50 66.8% 66.5% 90.3% 89.8%
Broccoli
VGG-16 29.3% 29.0% 59.7% 59.5%
VGG-19 31.2% 30.5% 59.7% 59.4%
ResNet-50 46.4% 46.6% 74.6% 73.9%
Stone wall
VGG-16 47.1% 46.7% 75.0% 74.5%
VGG-19 48.4% 48.1% 73.9% 72.9%
ResNet-50 74.7% 74.4% 92.0% 91.3%
A higher perturbation magnitude ζ leaded to a higher tar-
geted attack success rate rts. The success rates rts depended
on the image classes. For example, the targeted attacks to
the class “Golf ball” were more easily achieved than those
to the class “Broccoli”. The success rates rts also depended
DNN architectures; in particular, the ResNet-50 model was
more easy-to-fool than the VGG models.
The targeted UAPs with ζ = 6% and ζ = 8% were almost
imperceptible (Fig. 3); however, they were partly perceptible
for whitish images (e.g., trimaran). Moreover, the UAPs seem
to reflect object shapes of each target class.
The targeted attack success rates in the ImageNet models
were relatively lower than those in the CIFAR-10 models.
This is because the ImageNet dataset has a larger number of
classes than the CIFAR-10 dataset does. In short, it is more
difficult to exactly classify an input image into a specific
target class within a larger number of classes. Moreover, the
observed lower success rate may be because the validation
dataset of ILSVRC2012 was used when generating targeted
UAPs. Higher success rates may be obtained when generat-
ing targeted UAPs using training images.
Fig. 3. Targeted UAPs (top panel) against the ResNet-50 model for
the ImageNet dataset and their adversarial attacks to original (i.e., non-
perturbated) images (left panel) randomly selected from the images that,
without perturbation, correctly classified into the source class and, with the
perturbation, correctly classified into each target classes under the constraint
that the source classes are not overlapped each other and with the target
classes. The source classes displayed here are sleeping bag (A), sombrero
(B), trimaran (C), steam locomotive (D), fireboat (E), and water ouzel,
dipper (F). The target classes are golf ball (0), broccoli (1), and stone wall
(2). The UAPs with ζ = 6% and ζ = 8% are shown. Note that UAPs are
emphatically displayed for clarity; in particular, each UAP was scaled with
the maximum of 1 and the minimum of 0.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a simple iterative method to generate targeted
UAPs for image classification, although the proposed al-
gorithm is a straightforward extension of the non-targeted
UAP algorithm [4]. A similar iterative algorithm has been
proposed to generate targeted UAPs for audio processing
systems [10]. Using the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet models,
we demonstrated that a small (almost imperceptible) UAP
generated by our method made the models largely classify
test images into a target class. Our method is expected to
have lower computational costs, compared with the genera-
tive model-based method [5]; however, such a comparison is
a subject of future investigation. Our results indicated the ex-
istence of UAPs for targeted attacks and that such UAPs are
easily generatable. Our study enhances our understanding of
the vulnerabilities of DNNs to adversarial attacks; moreover,
it may help increase the security of DNNs [11].
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